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Advertising and Aggregate Consumption:
A Bayesian DSGE Assessment∗
Benedetto Molinari and Francesco Turino
Aggregate data reveal that in the U.S., advertising absorbs 2% of GDP. Because the
purpose of brand advertising is to foster sales, we ask whether such spending apprecia-
bly affects aggregate consumption and economic activity. This question is addressed
by developing and estimating a dynamic general equilibrium model in which house-
holds’ preferences for differentiated goods depend on brand advertising. Estimated
results for the U.S. economy indicate that in the long-run, the presence of advertis-
ing raises aggregate consumption, investment, and hours worked, eventually fostering
overall economic activity. We also find that advertising has a relevant impact on
fluctuations in consumption and investment.
”... as a matter of fact, the scale of expenditures on advertising
varies positively with the general level of economic activity, so that,
insofar as the effect of marginal expenditures is positive,
advertising itself tends to accentuate the amplitude of economic fluctuations.”
Nicholas Kaldor (1950)
In 2005, firms spent 272 billion dollars on advertising their products in U.S. media,
amounting to approximately 1200 dollars per person. The U.S. advertising industry accounts
for 2.2% of GDP, absorbs approximately 20% of firms’ budgets for new investments and uses
16% of their corporate profits. Traditionally, the rationale for firms’ spending on advertising
has been identified as the positive effect of advertisements on sales. Firms realize that the
demand that they face is not an exogenous product of consumers’ preferences; instead,
it can be tilted toward their own products through advertisements. The effectiveness of
advertising in enhancing demand is not only revealed by firms’ willingness to spend money
on it but is also supported by a large number of empirical studies.1 Building on this fact, we
∗Corresponding author: Francesco Turino, Universidad de Alicante, Dpto. Fundamentos del Ana´lisis
Econo´mico, Campus de San Vicente, 03690 Alicante, Spain. Email: fturino@ua.es.
The authors would like to thank the editor, Morten Ravn, and two anonymous referees who kindly
reviewed the earlier version of this manuscript and provided valuable suggestions and comments. The
authors also wish to acknowledge useful discussion with and suggestions by Jordi Gal´ı, Alberto Bisin,
Albert Marcet, David Andolfatto, Enrique Sentana, Fabio Canova, Tim Kehoe, Andrea Caggese, Pierluigi
Ciocca, M. Dolores Collado Vindel, Francesco Serti, Renzo Orsi, Davide Raggi, Sonia Oreffice, Climent
Quintana-Domeque, Claudio Campanale, Antonio Minniti and participants of the 9th RCEA Bayesian
Workshop, 2009 SED Annual Meeting, the Macro Workshop at UPF, the XI Workshop on Dynamic
Macroeconomics in Vigo, and the ASSET 2006 Conference. Albert Marcet and Ramon Marimon are
gratefully acknowledged for the financial support provided to collect the data used in the paper. The
database was made available by the courtesy of the staff of Johnson Graduate School of Management
Library (Sage Hall, Cornell University). Molinari acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry
of Science and Technology (Grants SEJ1512 and ECO2013-43526-R). Turino acknowledges financial support
from MINECO/FEDER (ECO2015-70540-P).
1A survey of empirical studies on the advertising-sales relationship can be found in Vakratsas and Ambler
(1999) or Bagwell (2007).
This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not 
been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may 
lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as 
doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12514 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le ask whether this relationship holds in the aggregate. Because the reason for advertising is toincrease consumer demand, as brand advertising increases the sales of individual goods, willaggregate advertising enhance aggregate consumption? If so, will it also increase aggregatedemand and production? That is, how important are the spillovers from the advertising
sector to economic activity?
To address these questions, we build and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model in which we explicitly account for advertising. The usage of a
Bayesian DSGE methodology to assess the advertising-consumption relationship is a novel
approach in the literature. We believe that this method is a reasonable choice for at least
two reasons. First, advertising is not merely a matter of demand and consumption; rather,
it can affect economic activity through various other channels, for instance, by increasing
the substitutability among goods, thereby influencing firms’ market power, or by reducing
consumers’ savings, thereby decreasing future demand. A general equilibrium framework
can conveniently cope with all of these effects. Second, a DSGE model incorporates both
steady-state equilibrium and aggregate dynamics, thus providing a unified framework to
study the long- and short-run effects of advertising in the aggregate. The model developed
here is a variant of the neoclassical stochastic growth model augmented with a govern-
ment sector, monopolistically competitive product markets, and real rigidities in the form
of habit persistence, adjustment costs and variable capital utilization. Advertising is in-
troduced into this framework by assuming that consumers’ preferences are endogenously
determined, depending on the distribution of advertising expenditures across firms. In par-
ticular, brand advertising is intended to raise the marginal utility of the advertised good,
and this assumption creates a positive linkage between advertising and sales. In addition,
we assume that rival advertising affects firms’ sales both by attracting new customers to
the market (market-enhancing effect) and by stealing existing customers from competitors
(demand-stealing effect). This feature captures the classical dichotomy emphasized in the
industrial organization (IO) literature: a firm’s advertising may exert either positive or neg-
ative spillovers on the demand faced by competitors (e.g., Roberts and Samuelson, 1988;
Karray and Martn-Herrn, 2009).
The model is estimated using quarterly data for the U.S. economy over the 1976:I-2006:IV
period. Because advertising is not considered among the main business cycle indicators, the
database we employ includes a novel series of total advertising expenditures gathered by
aggregating firms’ spending on advertisements in a number of heterogeneous U.S. media.
The results of the Bayesian estimation provide evidence in favour of a positive advertising-
consumption relationship, and we show that this finding is crucially related to the degree
of advertising competitiveness at the firm level. In the long run, in addition to a 6.79%
increase in consumption, we find that advertising increases hours worked by 11%, GDP by
6.43%, and investment by 4.28%. The underlying mechanism operates through a work and
spend channel: because of advertising, people work more to consume more, and the per-
ceived need for additional consumption results from the advertising signals to which people
are exposed. We show that this mechanism makes households unambiguously worse off
because the overworking effect more than compensates for the expansion in consumption.
Furthermore, we find that the average markup increases by 1.87%, thereby providing evi-
dence in favour of an anti-competitive effect of advertising in the U.S. economy. In the short
run, the spillover effects of advertising are concentrated on consumption and investment. In
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le particular, we find that the volatility of consumption increases by 22.5%, whereas that ofinvestment declines by 13.4%. These results are driven by a short-run intertemporal mech-anism that pushes households to increase current consumption at the expense of savings.The resulting crowding effect on investment dampens the impact of advertising on output
and, in general, softens the quantitative implications of the work and spending mechanism
for short-run fluctuations.
The existing literature on the effects of advertising in the aggregate economy is largely
empirical. Taylor and Weiserbs (1972), Ashley et al. (1980), Chowdhury (1994), and Jung
and Seldon (1995) estimate reduced-form specifications using aggregate time series to test
for the existence of an advertising-consumption relationship based on Granger causality.
Although their results are controversial and not conclusive, some evidence has emerged in
favour of bi-directional Granger causality between advertising and aggregate consumption
in the U.S. economy. In this paper, we depart from this literature because we analyse
the advertising-consumption relationship using a structural econometric approach. This
methodology has the advantage of overcoming the potential problem of endogeneity affecting
the reduced-form estimations cited above and additionally allows for a general assessment
of the aggregate spillovers of advertising. Few other papers examine the macroeconomics
of advertising from a theoretical perspective. Bisin and Benhabib (2010) analyse the condi-
tions under which the neoclassical theory reproduces the so-called post-modernist critique
of society. Grossmann (2008) analyses the welfare implications of the complementarity be-
tween advertising and R&D expenditures in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth.
Both papers exploit a general equilibrium setup incorporating persuasive advertising a` la
Dixit-Norman akin to that used in our paper. Finally, Hall (2008) analyses the general
equilibrium implications of rent-seeking activities, showing that advertising is a procyclical
activity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the novel data on
aggregate advertising used in the estimation, together with their business cycle properties.
Section 2 provides the DSGE model with advertising, which is then estimated in Section 3.
Section 4 analyses some properties of the estimated model, while Section 5 quantifies the
short- and long-run spillovers of advertising in the U.S. economy and evaluates their welfare
implications. Section 6 concludes the paper. Technical details on the estimated model and
additional results are available in the online appendix.
1. Advertising Industry in the U.S.
In what follows, we define aggregate advertising as the total amount of spending by
domestic and foreign firms to advertise their products in domestic media. In Figure 1, we
assess the magnitude of aggregate advertising in the U.S. economy using the annual series
of aggregate advertising constructed by Robert J. Coen of Universal McCann. Advertising
experts consider this to be the most reliable and complete source of data on aggregate ad-
vertising. Panel 1 depicts real per capita advertising, which serves as a proxy for the number
of advertising messages received by each individual. The statistic shows an average annual
growth rate of 2%, thus indicating that the intensity of advertising per consumer has grown
steadily over time. Panel 2 portrays the ratio of aggregate advertising to private domestic
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le Figure 1: Aggregate Advertising in the U.S.
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sales, which measures the fraction of resources that firms employ in marketing practice.
Advertising fluctuates around a long-run mean of 3%, accounting for, approximately, 20%
of investment budgets and absorbing almost the same amount of resources as that employed
in R&D.
What remains unclear from previous analysis is the relationship between advertising and
economic activity in the short run. Although the ratio of advertising to private domestic
sales shows large fluctuations and appears positively correlated with GDP, annual data are
not an ideal candidate to assess short-run comovements because they mask information on
in-year contractions and expansions. To overcome this issue, we perform a proper business
cycle analysis using quarterly data. Because aggregate advertising is not available among
the standard business cycle indicators, we construct a novel quarterly series reporting the
unweighed sum of nominal quarterly expenditures on advertisements in 10 U.S. media outlets
covering the 1976−2006 period. To obtain a real series, nominal data are deflated using the
GDP deflator, which has the closest resemblance to an advertising-spending-specific deflator
(see Seldom and Jung, 1995). Further analysis and details on data construction and sources
are given in the online appendix.
In Figure 2, we plot the cyclical component of real advertising expenditures along with
real GDP (panel 1), real total consumption and real fixed private investment (panel 2).
Advertising appears procyclical, more volatile than GDP and consumption, and less volatile
than investment. Table 1 reports the related business cycle statistics, which confirm these
findings. Advertising displays a positive correlation with GDP (0.71) and is more than
twice as volatile as GDP. Furthermore, it is persistent over the cycle, with a point estimate
of the first-order autocorrelation of 0.89. Concerning the other macroeconomic aggregates,
advertising displays the strongest correlation with total consumption (0.66). Moreover,
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le Figure 2: Cyclical Properties of Advertising
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it is more than 3 times more volatile than hours worked and total consumption, almost
4 times more volatile than non-durable consumption, slightly more volatile than durable
consumption and 30% less volatile than investment. We also find that the ratio of advertising
to GDP is positively correlated with GDP itself. This result suggests that firms do not spend
a constant proportion of their revenues on advertising, as would be predicted by the standard
theory of optimal advertising budgeting (e.g., Dorfman and Steiner, 1954).
2. A DSGE Model with Advertising
We consider an economy in which a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by i ∈
[0, 1] are produced by monopolistically competitive producers. Goods are sold by firms to
households for consumption and investment purposes and to the government, which collects
taxes from households to finance public expenditures. Households’ preferences for differen-
tiated goods are not exogenous but depend on the distribution of advertising expenditures
across firms. Firms are aware of this linkage and compete in the market jointly using ad-
vertising budgeting and pricing policy. All of the interactions among firms, households and
the government occur in a stochastic environment in which short-run dynamics are driven
by several demand and supply shocks.
2.1. The Representative Household and the Role of Advertising
The representative household has preferences in period 0 given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
[(Xt − ζXt−1) /Γt](1−σ) − 1
1− σ − ξ
h
t
H1+φt
1 + φ
}
, (1)
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le Table 1: Real Business Cycle StatisticsXt σ(Xt)σ(Gdpt) corr(X t, Advt) corr(X t, GDP t) corr(X t, X t−1)Advertising 2.30 1 0.71 0.89
GDP 1 0.71 1 0.93
Consumption 0.63 0.66 0.91 0.94
Non-Dur. 0.54 0.62 0.80 0.93
Durables 2.06 0.62 0.88 0.93
Investment 3.00 0.58 0.83 0.93
Hours worked 0.66 0.61 0.90 0.92
Adv/GDP 1.74 0.91 0.36 0.87
Notes. Cyclical components have been extracted from data by using the Band Pass filter with (6-32)
bands. The series of aggregate advertising has been pre-treated for seasonality using the X11 filter. The
series of GDP is GDP minus net exports. See Appendix A for a description of data and sources.
where Xt is the utility aggregate, Ht is hours worked, β ∈ (0, 1) represents the subjective dis-
count factor, ζ ∈ [0, 1] controls for the degree of internal habit persistence, and {φ, σ} ∈ R2+
are preference parameters. ξht is a preference shock that follows a univariate autoregressive
process of the form log(ξht /ξ) = ρhlog(ξ
h
t−1/ξ) + 
h
t , in which 
h
t are i.i.d. innovations with
mean 0 and standard deviation σh. To ensure that the economy evolves along a balanced
growth path, we assume that households derive utility from the object Xt − ζXt−1 relative
to the deterministic level of labour-augmenting technological progress, Γt, which grows at
the constant rate τ > 0.
Building on Dixit and Norman (1978), we assume that the utility aggregate, Xt, takes
the following form
Xt =
 1∫
0
(ci,t −B (fi,t, f−i,t,Γt))
ε−1
ε di

ε
ε−1
, (2)
where ci,t denotes the quantity of good i consumed in period t, ε > 1 is the pseudo-elasticity
of substitution across varieties, fi,t and f−i,t denote firm’s own and its competitors’ goodwill,
respectively, which summarize the effects of advertising outlays on preferences. Following
Nerlove and Arrow (1962), we assume that the intangible stock of goodwill evolves according
to the rule fi,t = (1− δf ) fi,t−1 + (1− φz (zi,t/zi,t−1)) zi,t, where zi,t is a firm’s investment in
new advertising, δf ∈ (0, 1) is the goodwill depreciation rate, and φz(·) denotes standard
quadratic adjustment costs satisfying φ′′z(τ) = ψz > 0. Finally, function B(·) is specified as
B(·) = θfi,t
1 + θfi,t/Γt
− γ θf−i,t
1 + θf−i,t/Γt
, (3)
where f−i,t =
∫ 1
0
fj,tdj, parameter θ > 0 controls for the intensity of brand advertising in
affecting consumer’s preferences, and γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of competitiveness in
advertising at the firm level.
The adopted formulation implies that advertising is persuasive in that it affects con-
sumers’ choices by modifying their tastes (see Bagwell, 2007, ch.2). In the model, the
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le persuasive effect is replicated by assuming that exposure to brand advertising creates anegative externality that induces households to feel dissatisfaction with their current levelsof consumption. The utility aggregate (2) also implies that brand advertising decreases thesubstitutability between advertised goods and rival products (brand equity effect).2 The
specification of B(·) in turn nests any intermediate type of advertising between two extreme
cases in which advertising either merely redistributes market shares across firms or enhances
the market size. The mapping is controlled by γ. Its role is apparent if one examines the
demand function for good i, which is determined by minimizing consumption expenditures
subject to the utility aggregate (2), i.e.,
ci,t = (pi,t/Pt)
−εXt +B(fi,t, f−i,t,Γt),
where Pt = [
∫ 1
0
p1−εi,t di]
1/(1−ε) is the price index. Accordingly, an incremental investment in
advertisements for rival products, f−i,t, negatively affects the demand for good i. When γ =
1, this demand-stealing effect is maximized, and in the symmetric equilibrium, advertising
is a zero-sum game that leaves the demand function unaffected. We therefore refer to
this case as purely competitive advertising. Conversely, when γ = 0, the demand-stealing
mechanism is switched off (∂B(·)/∂f−i,t = 0), and brand advertising expands a producer’s
sales regardless of the intensity of competitors’ advertising. In this case, the advertising
of each individual firm exerts upward pressure on aggregate demand, eventually enhancing
the market size. Finally, when γ ∈ (0, 1), the parametrization yields a combination of
the two extreme cases in which firms’ advertising both steals customers from competitors
and expands the size of the market. We refer to this general case as market-enhancing
advertising.
For the rest of the demand side of the model, we assume that each household holds
one asset, the capital stock K¯t, and in each period t chooses the capital utilization rate,
ut, to transform physical capital into effective capital according to the rule Kt = utK¯t.
The cost of capital utilization is defined in units of physical capital and is given by a(ut) =
Rkss (ωu
2
t/2 + (1− ω)ut + ω/2− 1), where Rkss denotes the rental rate of capital evaluated in
the steady state and ω > 0. Physical capital evolves according to the law of motion K¯t+1 =
(1− δk) K¯t + ξkt (1− φk (It/It−1)) It, where It is investment in new capital, δk ∈ (0, 1) is the
capital depreciation rate, and φk(·) denotes standard quadratic adjustment costs satisfying
φ′′k(τ) = ψk > 0. ξ
k
t is an investment-specific shock that follows a univariate autoregressive
process of the form log(ξkt ) = ρklog(ξ
k
t−1) + 
k
t , in which 
k
t are i.i.d. innovations with mean
0 and standard deviation σk. Investment in new capital is assumed to be a composite good
produced by aggregating differentiated goods via technology It = (
∫ 1
0
i
(ε−1)/ε
i,t di)
ε/(ε−1).
Each household supplies labour services per unit of time and rents physical capital to
firms. Labour and capital markets are perfectly competitive, with a wage rate Wt paid per
unit of labour services and a rental rate Rkt paid per unit of capital. In addition, households
receive profit Πt for the ownership of firms and pay lump-sum taxes Tt to finance exoge-
nous and stochastic government spending Gt. In each period, the government allocates the
spending Gt over a basket of intermediate goods to maximize the amount of the composite
good produced with the CES technology, Gt = (
∫ 1
0
g
(ε−1)/ε
i,t )
ε/(ε−1).
2As documented in several empirical studies, building brand equity thorough advertising is a successful
strategy to differentiate firms’ own products from rival brands (see e.g., Kamakura and Russell, 1993).
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le 2.2. FirmsFirms produce output by combining labour (hpi,t) and capital (ki,t) using the technologyyi,t = Ayt k1−αi,t (Γthpi,t)α, where α ∈ (0, 1) and Ayt is a purely transitory technology shock
that evolves according to log(Ayt ) = ρylog(A
y
t−1) + 
y
t , in which 
y
t are i.i.d. innovations with
mean 0 and standard deviation σy. Firms promote their products by incurring advertising
expenditures. Advertisements are produced in-house using the technology zi,t = A
z
tΓtha
αz
i,t ,
where αz ∈ (0, 1) and hai,t denotes advertising-related labour. Azt measures advertising-
specific productivity and evolves according to log(Azt ) = ρzlog(A
z
t−1)+
z
t +ρzy
y
t , in which 
z
t
are i.i.d. innovations with mean 0 and standard deviation σz. The dependence of advertising-
specific shocks on innovations, yt , is intended to capture the movements in advertising
spending driven by changes in the overall productivity of the economy. We therefore refer
to Ayt as an economy-wide productivity shock.
Firms jointly determine pricing policy, production plans and advertising budgeting by
maximizing the discounted flow of future profits. We show in the online appendix that
an optimal planning satisfies two main conditions. First, firms set the optimal price by
charging a positive markup over the marginal cost, i.e.,
pi,t = ηy,p(i)/ [(ηy,p(i)− 1)] ϕt ≡ µi,t ϕt, (4)
where ηy,p(i) = ε(1 − B(·)/yi,t) denotes the price elasticity of demand, ϕt is the marginal
cost of production and µi,t is the optimal markup, which is increasing in fi,t as a result of
the brand equity effect. Second, firms budget for advertising until the marginal benefit from
an additional unit of advertising equals its marginal cost, as stated in the following Euler
equation:
(pi,t − ϕt)∂B(·)/∂fi,t + (1− δf )Et {νi,t+1Qt,t+1} = νi,t, (5)
where Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor and νi,t is the marginal cost of producing
advertising. Consistent with the dynamic nature of goodwill, the marginal benefit on the
left-hand side of equation (5) is the one-period-ahead expected payoff from a marginal unit
of advertising, which sums up the marginal increase in current revenues with the discounted
future gain of not producing tomorrow the surviving goodwill produced today.
3. Parameter Estimates
3.1. Model Estimation and Priors
We restrict the analysis to detrended symmetric equilibria in which all firms set the
same price, produce the same quantity of goods, and invest the same amount of resources in
advertising. In addition, the price of goods is normalized to 1 such that all of the remaining
prices are defined in terms of contemporaneous consumption. The equilibrium conditions are
log-linearized around the steady state, and the resulting state-space solution is estimated
by following a Bayesian approach, which is performed using quarterly U.S. data on real
personal consumption expenditures, real GDP minus net exports, total hours worked, real
private nonresidential fixed investment and the series of real aggregate advertising presented
in Section 1. All data are in per capita terms and expressed as quarterly growth rates, with
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le the exception of hours worked, which is expressed as demeaned log-levels. The sample periodgoes from the first quarter of 1976 to the end of 2006, the time span for which quarterlydata on aggregate advertising are available.Prior distributions are summarized in Table 2. The elasticity of labour in the production
of advertising, αz, is beta distributed with a mean of 0.73 and a standard deviation of 0.02.
Conditional on the remaining parameters, this prior mean implies a steady-state ratio of
advertising-related labour to total hours worked (Ha/H) of 0.8%, which corresponds to
the average fraction of the labour force employed in the advertising industry during the
2002-2012 period, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The prior for γ is a
uniform [0,1] distribution that reflects our neutral stance between competitive and market-
enhancing advertising. The goodwill depreciation rate, δf , is assumed to follow a highly
disperse beta distribution with a mean of 0.15, implying a half-life of the goodwill stock of
approximately four quarters. This value is consistent with the empirical evidence provided in
Leone (1995), according to which the effect of advertising on a firm’s demand is short-lived.
The parameter controlling for advertising adjustment costs, ψz, is assumed to be gamma
distributed with a mean of 4 and a standard error of 1, which implies an equivalent elasticity
of the adjustment costs in the laws of motion of capital and advertising. Prior distributions
for the other parameters are consistent with previous studies (Smets and Wouters, 2007;
Iacoviello and Neri, 2010).
Five parameters are fixed in the estimation procedure. The gross elasticity of substitu-
tion across varieties, ε, and the depreciation rate of capital, δk, are set to 11.27 and 0.010,
respectively, to match the long-run average markup (1.11) and investment share (20%).
The intensity of advertising in enhancing demand, θ, is calibrated at 1.36, implying a long-
run ratio of advertising expenditures to GDP of 0.029, which is consistent with the data.
Following Ravn et al. (2006), the government spending-to-GDP ratio, G¯/Y , is set to 0.12,
whereas the preference parameter, ξ, is chosen such that the steady-state value of hours
worked is equal to 0.25, thus implying that households devote 1/4 of their time to labour
activities.
3.2. Posterior Distributions
Jointly with their corresponding priors, Table 2 reports posterior means and the 90%
probability intervals for the estimated parameters. According to the reported results, all
advertising-related parameters are estimated quite accurately. The data appear particularly
informative regarding the competitiveness parameter, γ, the posterior probability interval of
which is approximately 50% smaller than its prior counterpart. Its posterior mean is 0.593,
and the upper bound, γ = 1, lies well outside the 90% posterior probability interval, thereby
indicating that a market-enhancing effect of advertising is active in the U.S. economy. The
data are also substantially informative with respect to the parameter controlling for the
adjustment costs of advertising, ψz. Its posterior mean is equal to 1.227, suggesting a much
faster response of advertising to shocks than what was assumed a priori.
Regarding the stochastic processes, we find that government shocks, labour supply shocks
and economy-wide productivity shocks are quite persistent, with coefficients of autocorre-
lation ranging between 0.94 and 0.98. Advertising and investment-specific shocks show a
milder persistence, with autocorrelation coefficients equal to 0.84 and 0.75, respectively.
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le Table 2: Prior and Posterior DistributionsPriors PosteriorsParameter Density Domain Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
β Beta [0, 1) 0.995 [0.991 0.998] 0.993 [0.989 0.997]
σ Gamma R+ 2.000 [1.255 2.887] 1.366 [0.857 1.896]
φ Gamma R+ 0.770 [0.167 1.732] 2.143 [1.150 3.073]
γ Uniform [0, 1] 0.500 [0.050 0.950] 0.593 [0.354 0.822]
δf Beta [0, 1] 0.150 [0.025 0.343] 0.164 [0.069 0.279]
α Beta [0, 1] 0.708 [0.674 0.740] 0.741 [0.714 0.770]
αz Beta [0, 1] 0.734 [0.700 0.766] 0.717 [0.685 0.748]
τ ∗ Normal R 0.005 [.0017 .0083] .0045 [.0040 .0049]
ψk Gamma R+ 4.000 [2.509 5.774] 3.141 [1.822 4.350]
ψz Gamma R+ 4.000 [2.509 5.774] 1.227 [0.464 1.969]
ψu Beta (0, 1) 0.500 [0.171 0.828] 0.360 [0.104 0.602]
ζ Beta [0, 1] 0.500 [0.171 0.828] 0.321 [0.178 0.467]
ρy Beta [0, 1) 0.500 [0.172 0.828] 0.940 [0.892 0.985]
ρh Beta [0, 1) 0.900 [0.807 0.967] 0.945 [0.917 0.974]
ρg Beta [0, 1) 0.500 [0.172 0.828] 0.956 [0.934 0.978]
ρk Beta [0, 1) 0.500 [0.172 0.828] 0.750 [0.606 0.900]
ρz Beta [0, 1) 0.900 [0.807 0.967] 0.842 [0.720 0.960]
ρzy Beta [0, 1] 0.800 [0.505 0.981] 0.804 [0.593 0.998]
σy InvGamma R+ 0.008 [0.002 0.022] 0.006 [0.005 0.007]
σh InvGamma R+ 0.006 [0.001 0.017] 0.022 [0.014 0.029]
σg InvGamma R+ 0.010 [0.002 0.029] 0.048 [0.043 0.053]
σk InvGamma R+ 0.008 [0.002 0.022] 0.025 [0.015 0.035]
σz InvGamma R+ 0.006 [0.001 0.017] 0.041 [0.027 0.056]
Notes. In the estimation of the model, we adopt the normalization used in Smets and Wouters (2007) by
specifying the prior distribution for the curvature parameter ω in terms of ψu = ω/(1 + ω).
This result is likely to be driven by the presence of adjustment costs, which generate en-
dogenous persistence and therefore reduce the degree of exogenous autocorrelation needed to
match the actual persistence in investment and advertising data. The estimates of the other
structural parameters are consistent with the evidence available in the literature, with the
exception of the habits persistence parameter, ζ, which is substantially lower than existing
estimates (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007). The smaller degree of habits is most likely due
to the presence of goodwill in the marginal utility, which generates an additional mechanism
that helps to match the persistence in actual consumption data.
4. Properties of the Estimated Model
4.1. Impulse Responses
To disentangle the mechanisms through which advertising affects the aggregate economy,
Figure 3 depicts the estimated impulse response functions (IRF) of selected endogenous
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Notes. IRF with purely competitive advertising are computed by setting γ = 1 while holding all the
remaining parameters at their posterior mean values.
variables to a 1% increase in the advertising-specific shock (εzt ). A transitory boost in
the productivity of advertising (i) raises consumption, total hours worked, and markup;
(ii) induces a decline in investment and the wage rate; and (iii) leaves production-related
hours and output virtually unaffected. A positive εzt shock reduces the marginal cost of
producing advertising and strengthens firms’ incentives to expand their goodwill stocks.
In turn, greater goodwill raises the marginal utility of current consumption for several
quarters after the shock, thus providing a long-lasting influence on consumers’ choice.3
This mechanism triggers two key effects in the model economy. On the one hand, the
increase in the instantaneous marginal utility makes the household less willing to smooth
consumption through savings (intertemporal effect), thus driving a persistent decline in
investment accompanied by a positive and hump-shaped consumption response. Eventually,
these two countervailing effects jointly determine the muted response of output. On the
other hand, the same mechanism makes a household more willing to substitute consumption
for leisure (intratemporal effect), thus shifting the labour supply to the right and driving
the eventual increase in total hours worked and a decline in the real wage. The muted
response of production-related labour reveals that the increase in total hours worked is
mostly absorbed by the reallocation of labour to the advertising sector and suggests that
the output dynamics are entirely determined by the intertemporal effect. Finally, the brand
equity effect of advertising implies that the price elasticity of each good decreases with a
larger goodwill stock, thus explaining the increase in the average markup after a positive
advertising-specific shock.
Figure 3 also depicts the IRF in a counterfactual economy with purely competitive
advertising. As the figure illustrates, the market-enhancing effect is the key property of the
3This effect is apparent in Figure 3, which shows that both the marginal utility of consumption and
consumption itself display a positive and hump-shaped response to the shock.
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at their posterior mean values.
estimated model for generating a positive and persistent response of consumption after an
increase in aggregate advertising. Absent this effect (i.e., γ = 1), an exogenous boost in
advertising productivity raises the equilibrium level of advertising but induces a negative and
short-lived consumption response. The reason is that the demand for goods, the marginal
utility of consumption, and the labour supply in this case are all independent of advertising.
Hence, the labour reallocation induced by the shock is the only mechanism through which
advertising affects the aggregate economy. This effect shifts resources from a productive to
a now unproductive sector (advertising), thereby determining the slight decline in output
and its components.
Beyond the direct effects of advertising-specific shocks, the presence of advertising also
induces an amplification mechanism for technology shocks. This additional channel can be
isolated by comparing the estimated impulse response functions to a positive economy-wide
technology shock with those implied by a counterfactual economy with idiosyncratic tech-
nological shocks (i.e., ρzy = 0). As is apparent from Figure 4, the response of consumption
is amplified in the estimated model. Intuitively, when ρzy > 0, a positive technology shock
also increases the productivity of advertising, thereby pushing firms to expand their good-
will stocks. The resulting greater goodwill raises the instantaneous marginal utility, thus
providing the additional consumption response. The muted response of investment and the
virtually identical response of total hours worked clarify that the amplification effect on
consumption occurs at the expense of savings and not of leisure.
Finally, Figure 4 reveals that the countercyclical response of the average markup is
substantially muted in the estimated model, which is a direct implication of the brand
equity effect of advertising. In our model, the countercyclical response of the markup is
driven by the time-varying price elasticity of each good i, which is an increasing function of
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Hence, any shock enhancing aggregate demand also pushes firms to cut markups. When the
amplification mechanism is active, however, the negative effect of a larger goodwill stock
on the price elasticity counteracts the impact of aggregate demand, thereby softening the
countercyclical response of markups.
Although in the model the negative relationship between markups and the aggregate
demand stems from the brand equity assumption, in equilibrium, this mechanism is akin to
the price elasticity effect induced by external deep habits in the formulation proposed by
Ravn et al. (2006). However, there is a crucial difference between the two models, which
lies in how customer bases are built. With deep habits, whenever firms find it convenient
to build their customer bases, they cut current markups because the future demands for
individual varieties depend positively on current sales. In our model, firms build customer
bases by incurring advertising expenditures, and this raises current markups, as discussed
above. Hence, advertising and deep habits have the opposite implications for firms’ pricing
policies.
4.2. Sources of Advertising and Consumption Comovements
In this section, we use the estimated model to analyse the sources of comovements
between advertising and aggregate consumption. To this end, some useful insights can be
elicited from the optimal advertising policy (5) evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
Ft = Φt(1− µ−1t )(ηc,f (t)Ct), (6)
where ηc,f (t) > 0 stands for the elasticity of the demand for individual varieties of goods with
respect to goodwill, and Φt = 1/[νt − (1− δf )Etνt+1Qt,t+1] > 0. Equation (6) states that
any shock that increases aggregate consumption (Ct =
∫ 1
o
ci,t) also pushes firms to expand
their goodwill stocks. This is the direct source of the comovements between advertising and
consumption and stems from firms’ strategic use of advertising to maintain their market
shares when market demand increases. This effect can be either amplified or attenuated by
simultaneous changes in the term (1 − µ−1t ), depending on whether the shock decreases or
increases the price elasticity of demand. Finally, the term Φt captures the indirect sources of
correlation between consumption and advertising driven by temporary changes in technology
and by movements in factor prices.
To assess the relative importance of these different sources, we simulate the model by
excluding one shock at a time and then computing the implied correlation between con-
sumption and advertising in each case. The results of this experiment are summarized in
Table 3, where we also report the predicted correlation when all the shocks are active (base-
line estimation) and the correlation implied by idiosyncratic technological shocks (panel B).
As the table illustrates, advertising-specific (εzt ) and economy-wide technology (ε
y
t ) shocks
are the most important driving forces of the predicted correlation, as shutting down these
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Advertising Technology Labour Government Investment ρzy = 0
(εzt ) (ε
y
t ) (ε
h
t ) (ε
g
t ) (ε
k
t )
Corr(Zt, Ct) 0.61 0.39 0.29 0.52 0.65 0.68 0.34
Notes. Predicted correlations are computed by simulating the estimated model with the smoothed esti-
mates of active shocks and then filtering the simulated series with the BP(6,32) filter. In panel B, the
correlation is computed using the estimated model with all shocks active and all parameters set at their
posterior mean values, except for ρzy, which is set equal to 0.
shocks reduces the statistic by approximately 40% and 60%, respectively, whereas the ef-
fect of other shocks is either negligible or much smaller. In addition, panel B highlights
the importance of the comovements between these two shocks in matching the advertising-
consumption correlation. The counterfactual model with ρz,y = 0, in fact, only explains
approximately half of the correlation in the data.
5. Quantitative Results
In what follows, we use the estimated model to quantify the aggregate implications of
advertising and provide an answer to the questions posited in the introduction. We find
that advertising enhances consumption both in the long (Section 5.1) and in the short run
(Section 5.2), even though the overall spillovers are noticeably different depending on the
time horizon considered. While in the long run advertising fuels overall economic activity,
in the short run it has a contained impact on output because the positive effect driven
by higher aggregate consumption is offset by a crowding-out effect on investment. The
analysis is concluded by discussing the welfare implications of these findings (Section 5.3).
Throughout the section, the effects of advertising are identified using a counterfactual model
that is identical to the baseline estimated model except for the assumption that advertising
is banned. We refer to this case as the benchmark economy without advertising.
5.1. Long-run Spillovers
Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimated steady state of selected endogenous variables
in percentage deviations from their counterparts in the benchmark economy without adver-
tising. According to the estimated model, advertising substantially stimulates consumption
(6.79%), GDP (6.43%) and investment (4.28%); induces a strong increase in hours worked
(11%); and drives a decline in the wage rate (-2.47%). Furthermore, it moderately raises
the average markup (1.87%) and leads to a more consumption-based economy (the share of
consumption in GDP increases by 0.40%).
In the long run, the intertemporal effect of advertising is switched off because the only
investment undertaken is the one that replaces the depreciated capital. The intratemporal
effect of advertising is instead at work and drives the observed spillovers. This result can
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le Table 4: Long-run SpilloversModel (A) Estimated (γ = 0.593) (B) Counterfactual (γ = 1)Median 90% interval Median 90% interval
Consumption 6.79 [0.42 17.3] -1.56 [-2.77 -0.37]
Total hours worked 11.0 [1.58 25.3] 0.99 [0.25 1.81]
Wage -2.47 [-6.28 -0.25] 0 −
GDP 6.43 [0.47 16.9] -1.55 [-2.73 -0.33]
Investment 4.28 [0.05 12.2] -1.55 [-2.73 -0.33]
Markup 1.87 [0.19 4.92] 0 −
Consumption share 0.40 [0.04 1.02] 0 −
Notes. For each variable, the effect of advertising is computed as the percentage variation of its steady
state from the corresponding steady state value in the benchmark model without advertising. To account
for parameter uncertainty, we construct a random section of 50,000 draws from the posterior distribution
and compute the steady-state effects for each draw. Summary statistics are then computed by pooling all
the simulations. For each draw, the benchmark steady state is computed from the estimated model by
setting θ = 0. The counterfactual model in panel B is computed using the estimated parameters, except
for γ, which is set equal to 1.
be made explicit by observing that the households’ intratemporal optimality condition in
the steady-state equilibrium reads as
ξhHφ (C − (1− γ)θF/(1 + θF ))σ /Λ = W, (7)
where Λ = (1− βζ/τ)1/φ (1− ζ/τ)−σ. Any positive amount of advertising (F > 0) implies
that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is smaller than in
the benchmark economy without advertising, thus resulting in more hours (H) supplied in
the labour market and a lower wage (W ) as a general equilibrium result. The abundance of
cheaper labour in turn induces firms to expand their production, and the associated positive
effect on income explains the observed increase in consumption and investment. Further-
more, the production of goods becomes more labour intensive and the optimal capital-output
ratio declines.4 The investment share thus decreases, and this explains the associated in-
creases in the consumption share. Additionally, because market-enhancing advertising is
effective in shifting consumers’ preferences, firms exploit the wedge between perceived and
true product differentiation by charging higher prices. In equilibrium, the average markup
increases, implying an anti-competitive effect of advertising in the U.S. economy.
The above mechanism linking advertising to consumption through the labour supply is
known in the literature as the work and spend cycle and has been empirically supported by
Baker and George (2010) for the U.S. and by Fraser and Paton (2003) for the U.K. Our
results complement and extend this empirical evidence, showing that the effectiveness of
the work and spend channel crucially depends on the degree of competitiveness in adver-
tising. In fact, equation (7) highlights that in the purely competitive case, the marginal
4This is true because the equilibrium capital rental rate (Rk = (τ − β(1 − δk))/β) is independent of
advertising and common across the baseline and the benchmark economy.
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(A) Asymptotic variance decomposition (percentages)
(A.1) Baseline estimation
Productivity (yt ) 32.3 6.17 19.6 49.1 4.51
Labuor supply (ht ) 21.0 64.0 13.1 33.7 2.31
Government (gt ) 13.7 14.0 5.29 9.10 1.40
Investment (kt ) 16.1 11.6 50.0 7.91 1.77
Advertising (ht ) 16.9 4.12 12.1 0.15 90.0
(A.2) Purely competitive advertising (γ = 1)
Productivity (yt ) 36.2 5.16 20.9 51.0 0
Labor Supply (ht ) 24.6 71.0 13.9 34.4 0
Government (gt ) 16.8 12.4 5.89 7.28 0
Investment (kt ) 22.1 11.2 59.1 6.91 0
Advertising (ht ) 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.41 0
(B) Historical contribution (% change in volatility)
All Shocks 22.5 15.8 -13.4 12.9 −
No Advertising Shock -11.6 5.10 12.6 14.1 −
Notes. If not otherwise specified, all of the statistics reported in the table are computed by setting
parameters to the posterior mean values. Asymptotic variance decomposition refers to HP(1600) filtered
variables.
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure coincides with that of the benchmark
economy, and therefore, the labour supply becomes independent of advertising. The work
and spend mechanism is also crucial in determining both the sign and scale of the overall
spillover effects of advertising. This can be seen in panel B of Table 4, where we report the
steady-state effects in the counterfactual economy with purely competitive advertising. The
comparison with the estimated model highlights that (i) without the labour supply effect,
advertising would be wasteful in the long run, as GDP and its components all decline when
γ = 1, and (ii) in both cases, hours worked increase in equilibrium, but the effect of the work
and spend cycle is more than 10 times larger than the labour reallocation effect induced by
purely competitive advertising. In the literature, the importance of the labour supply effect
was already postulated by Galbraith (1958), who argued that firms use advertising as a way
to manipulate preferences with the aim of fostering high levels of consumption to increase
profits. This process would affect agents’ decisions regarding consumption and leisure, even-
tually increasing the supply of labour and the monopolistic power of firms and inducing a
greater need for material consumption that makes the economy more consumption based.
Our results are in line with Galbraith’s conjecture.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le Figure 5: Predicted Consumption and Investment
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5.2. Short-run Spillovers
As shown in Section 4, exogenous shifts in advertising productivity are transmitted to
the economy through adjustments in advertising spending and, therefore, drive the direct
effects of advertising fluctuations on the other macro aggregates. To assess the quantita-
tive importance of these effects at business cycle frequencies, panel A.1 of Table 5 reports
the asymptotic variance decomposition in the estimated model. The results show that
advertising-specific shocks (zt ) contribute noticeably to the fluctuations in consumption,
investment and markup accounting for 16.9%, 12.1% and 90% of their volatility, respec-
tively. By contrast, the contribution to the volatility of total hours worked appears small
(4.12%), and the contribution to the volatility of GDP is almost null (0.15%). The results
in panel A.2 highlight that all of these effects vanish when the market-enhancing property
is switched off (γ = 1), thereby showing that the labour reallocation effect alone has a
negligible impact on macro aggregates. This finding confirms the long-run analysis on the
importance of market-enhancing advertising, highlighting that the mechanisms driven by
this property are also crucial for affecting the aggregate dynamics.
To quantify the overall spillovers resulting from the market-enhancing effect, we compute
in-sample estimates of the historical role played by advertising in shaping U.S. aggregate dy-
namics. To this end, Figure 5 presents predicted consumption and investment (continuous
lines) along with their counterparts implied by the benchmark model without advertising
(dashed lines), whereas panel B of Table 5 (first row) reports the in-sample variance of se-
lected endogenous variables in percentage deviations from their benchmark counterparts.5
5The reported results are obtained by setting the parameters to their posterior mean values and using
the resulting smoothed estimates of the shocks to simulate both the baseline and benchmark models. To
facilitate comparisons, the series reported in Figure 5 are normalized to equal 1 in the initial quarter.
Predictions for the benchmark model without advertising are obtained from the baseline model by setting
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le Figure 6: IRF of Consumption to Investment-Specific and Government Shocks
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Notes. The IRF in the estimated model are computed by setting all parameters to their posterior mean
values. The IRF in the benchmark model without advertising are computed by setting θ = 0 while holding
all the remaining parameters at their posterior mean values.
These statistics provide a comprehensive assessment of the short-run spillovers because, in
addition to the direct effects driven by advertising-specific shocks, they also capture the in-
direct effects due to the impact of advertising on the transmission mechanisms of the other
shocks. As Figure 5 illustrates, fluctuations in consumption are generally amplified by ad-
vertising. Quantitatively, the model predicts an average elasticity of aggregate consumption
to the goodwill stock of 10% (i.e., ηc,f (t) in equation 6), which results in a 22.5% increase
in consumption volatility. Investment shows the opposite pattern, with in-sample volatility
diminishing by 13.4% as result of the intertemporal effect of advertising. Regarding the
remaining macro aggregates, we find that the presence of advertising significantly affects
fluctuations of hours worked and GDP, increasing their volatilities by 15.8% and 12.9%,
respectively.
To establish in greater detail whether the positive relationship between advertising and
consumption is determined by the direct or the indirect effects, in Table 5 (panel B, second
row), we report the historical contribution of advertising to the volatility of the main aggre-
gates recomputed by shutting down advertising-specific shocks. In this experiment, shock
types are the same across the baseline and benchmark economy, and therefore, any differ-
ence in the volatility of the endogenous variables can be attributed to the indirect effects
of advertising. The reported results show that in the absence of advertising-specific shocks,
consumption volatility decreases with advertising, highlighting that (i) the direct effects are
crucial for a positive advertising-consumption relationship in the short run and that (ii) the
enhancing effect of advertising on the propensity to consume works as a dampening mecha-
nism of any shock that crowds out consumption. This last result can be observed in Figure
6, which shows that after a government or investment shock, consumption is less responsive
parameter θ = 0, whereas all of the other parameters are kept fixed at their posterior mean values.
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le Table 6: Welfare Effects of Advertising(A) Steady state (B) Transitional dynamicsMedian 90% interval Median 90% interval
Welfare gains
τ0 (percentages) -5.32 [-0.69 -16.2] -7.61 [-21.2 -3.55]
τz (percentages) -1.22 [-0.16 3.59] -2.80 [-5.51 0.211]
Advertising vs perfect competition
H(Z)/He 1.07 [1.01 1.17] - -
C(Z)/Ce 1.02 [0.96 1.12] - -
Notes. To account for parameter uncertainty, we construct a random section of 50,000 draws from the
posterior distribution and compute the welfare effects in steady state (panel A) and along the transition
path (panel B) for each draw. Summary statistics are then computed by pooling all the simulations. For
each draw, the equilibrium allocations with the banning policy are computed from the estimated model
by setting θ = 0. Equilibrium allocations with perfectly competitive products markets (Ce and He) are
determined from the benchmark model without advertising (θ = 0) by setting the average markup equal
to 1.
in the model with advertising, thus explaining why overall consumption volatility decreases
when the advertising-specific shocks are shut down.
5.3. Welfare Analysis
What remains unclear from the previous analysis is whether advertising is beneficial
for households. Advertising reduces welfare by inducing a higher markup that exacerbates
the distortions of monopolistic competition, but it may also improve welfare by fostering
consumption and hours worked, which potentially bring the economy closer to the com-
petitive equilibrium. To assess the overall effect of advertising, in this section, we use the
estimated model to perform a proper welfare analysis. In the presence of persuasive adver-
tising, however, the welfare analysis is complicated because advertising changes consumers’
tastes. Therefore, it is not obvious which reference welfare criterion should be used given
that there are at least two natural yardsticks: the pre-advertising and post-advertising pref-
erence relations.6 To address this issue, we follow Bisin and Benhabib (2010) by relying on
a welfare criterion that considers both preferences. Formally, let Z and U(C(Z), H(Z), Z)
denote the equilibrium level of aggregate advertising and the inter-temporal utility function,
respectively, associated with the allocation {C(Z), H(Z)} ∈ R∞+ . Then, a welfare criterion
can be defined as follows.
Definition 1. The household is better off in the presence of advertising if and only if welfare
increases with respect to post-advertising preferences,
U(C(Z), H(Z), Z) ≥ U (C (0) , H(0), Z)
6The issue is rather controversial in the literature. See Dixit and Norman (1978) and Bisin and Benhabib
(2010) for a detailed discussion of this topic.
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Notes. Initial dynamics of selected endogenous variables after a policy that bans advertising at time 0.
Parameters are set to their posterior mean values.
and it also increases with respect to pre-advertising preferences,
U(C(Z), H(Z), 0) ≥ U(C(0), H(0), 0)
with at least one inequality holding strictly.
Definition 1 states that the consumer is better off with advertising (Z > 0) if and only if
he prefers the allocation {C(Z), H(Z)} to the allocation {C(0), H(0)}, regardless of which
welfare yardstick is used. In particular, we compute the welfare gains of advertising as the
percentage decrease in consumption that is required to make the household as well off as
under a policy that totally bans advertising, i.e.,
U((1− τs)C(Z), H(Z), s) = U(C(0), H(0), s) with s = {0, z},
where τz and τ0 denote the welfare gains associated with pre-advertising and post-advertising
preferences, respectively. Hence, Definition 1 holds when both τ0 ≥ 0 and τz ≥ 0 with at
least one inequality holding strictly, whereas τs < 0 entails a welfare cost of advertising.
The results are reported in panels A and B of Table 6. The first panel refers to the direct
comparison of welfare between the pre- and post-policy steady states. The second panel
reports the results when computing the welfare costs along the entire transition from one
steady state to the other. Regarding the long-run equilibrium, we find that advertising is
unambiguously detrimental to welfare because the household is worse off according to both
ex ante and ex post preferences. For instance, with ex ante preferences, a compensation
in consumption of 5.32% is required to make households indifferent between the pre- and
post-policy allocations. The origin of this result can be traced back to the overworking effect
induced by advertising, which is apparent when comparing the steady state of the estimated
model with that of a perfectly competitive economy. As reported in panel A, advertising
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le pushes households to work 7% more hours, while they enjoy only 2% more consumptionwith respect to the efficient allocations, thus explaining the observed welfare losses. PanelB shows that this welfare-detrimental effect is even stronger when the transitional dynamicsare taken into account, in which case welfare costs increase to 7.61%. Figure 7 illustrates
that this amplification effect is due to the hump-shaped dynamics of consumption, which
implies that for several quarters after the banning of advertising, households work less and
consume more with respect to the pre-policy steady state.
6. Conclusions
This paper assesses the role of marketing practices in stimulating aggregate consumption
and economic activity. By estimating a variant of the neoclassical growth model that has
been developed to account for firms’ spending on advertising, we show that in the U.S.,
advertising has a relevant long-run effect on consumption and working activities. The
underlying mechanism operates through a work and spend channel: in the presence of
advertising, people work more to afford greater purchases of goods, and the perceived need
for higher consumption results from the advertising signals to which consumers are exposed.
Because of this effect, advertising enhances the production of output, eventually increasing
consumption and investment. In the short run, the effect of the work and spend channel is
offset by an intertemporal substitution mechanism that is absent in the long run. In reaction
to increases in firms’ spending on advertising, households substitute current consumption
for savings, and the resulting reduction in aggregate investment partially offsets the increase
in aggregate consumption, thereby softening the impact of advertising on output and hours
worked. Overall, we show that advertising affects the business cycle primarily through the
dynamics of consumption, investment and markup.
Benedetto Molinari, University of Malaga and RCEA
Francesco Turino, Universidad de Alicante
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Appendix A. Data
Data on Aggregate Advertising
Robert J. Coen All Media Annual 1948-2007
AD$Summary journal All Media Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Newspaper Association of America Newspapers Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Business Cycle Indicators
Macroeconomic Variable Code Freq. Sample
Real GDP GDPC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Real Export EXPGSC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Real Import IMPGSC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Real Personal Consumption Exp. PCECC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Real PCE: Durable Goods PCDGCC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Real PCE: Nondurable Goods PCNDGC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Real Private Fixed Investment FPIC96 Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
GDP Implicit Price Deflator GDPDEF Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Civ. Non-Instit. Population CNP160V Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Civ. Employment-Pop. Ratio EMRATIO Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
Average weekly hours of employees CES05007* Quarterly 1976.I-2006.IV
All Media refers to: Magazines, Sunday Magazines, Newspapers, Network Televisions, Spot/Local Televi-
sions, Syndicated Televisions, Cable Televisions, Spot/Local Radio, Syndicated Radio, Outdoor.
Data sources. Coen: Douglas Galbi’s blog (purplemotes.net/2009/05/10/robert-j-coen-advertising-data-
hero); AD$Summary: Library of the Johnson Graduate School of Management (Cornell University); NAA:
Newspaper Association of America media center (www.naa.org); Business Cycle Indicators. FRED II:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 ); *CES: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(www.bls.gov/ces).
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